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IntroductIon: trIal by Jury or trIal by MotIon?
 The New York Law School Law Review’s Spring 2012 symposium, Trial by Jury or 
Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment Discrimination, was 
planned jointly with The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute For Law & Policy 
(“The Institute”). This collection of articles drawn from the symposium focuses on 
pretrial motion practice in employment discrimination cases, with particular 
emphasis on the impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions making it more likely that 
cases would be dismissed in response to pretrial motions. The event brought together 
practitioners, judges, and academic scholars to consider the litigation landscape at a 
time of heightened pleading requirements, particularly in light of two Supreme 
Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2 Although 
neither of these was an employment discrimination case, they appeared to establish 
new “plausibility” pleading standards for federal civil litigation that could make it 
more difficult for cases to survive a motion to dismiss, and thus less likely that 
plaintiffs would be able to engage in pretrial discovery.3 These developments followed 
earlier Supreme Court decisions that encouraged federal trial courts to dispose of 
more cases in response to pretrial motions for summary judgment,4 and seemed 
inconsistent with the Court’s unanimous decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,5 
which arguably described a more liberal pleading standard.
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Iqbal, the Court clarified that the plausibility standard established in Twombly 
was not limited to the antitrust context of that decision, but applied generally as a construction of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to all federal civil litigation. Id. at 684.
3. In Twombly, the Court stated that an antitrust case
requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an 
agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not 
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts 
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.
 550 U.S. at 556.
  In Iqbal, the Court amplified this, in the context of a suit concerning the personal liability of high 
officials for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of underlings, as a more general interpretation of the 
requirements of Rule 8. The Court insisted that the plaintiff ’s complaint must include factual allegations 
from which a court could infer that the allegation of discriminatory intent by the defendant was more 
than merely possible; although probability need not be shown, an intermediate level of plausibility was 
required. 556 U.S. at 678–79.
4. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
5. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). The central holding of Swierkiewicz was that a plaintiff in a Title VII case need not 
allege all the factual prerequisites of a prima facie case in order to survive a dismissal motion, emphasizing 
that Rule 8 established a “notice pleading system.” Id. at 511. Quoting from a prior case, the Court in 
Swierkiewicz observed that the factual statement in a complaint “must simply ‘give the defendant fair 
notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” emphasizing that this 
“simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 
define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Id. at 512 (citation omitted). The 
Court also observed that this “simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions.” Id. at 513. 
Furthermore, the words “plausible” and “plausibility” do not appear anywhere in the Court’s opinion.
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 A member of the Law Review’s 2010–2011 editorial board, Eirik Cheverud, 
suggested building a symposium around these developments. His determined efforts, 
including enlisting me as a faculty advisor, bringing in The Institute as a coplanner and 
cosponsor, and persuading the Law Review’s editorial board of the importance of the 
topic, resulted in a wide-ranging, full-day program of panelists6 and a distinguished 
keynote speaker, the Honorable Denny Chin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.
 This collection of articles continues the effort begun by the symposium planners 
to bring together diverse viewpoints—albeit viewpoints from the judicial and 
plaintiff perspectives, not the defendant perspective—on the current situation facing 
employment discrimination plaintiffs in the federal courts. How should employment 
discrimination cases be decided? Why do unsettled employment discrimination cases 
suffer dismissal at a high rate as a result of pretrial motions?7 The symposium 
participants suggest varied answers to these questions, and their different perspectives 
should make a useful contribution to the ongoing debate. They document through 
statistics and anecdotal evidence that the Supreme Court’s rulings have arguably 
licensed federal district judges to play the role of a virtual jury, weighing evidence, 
drawing inferences (including some that seem biased towards defendants), and 
cutting off the plaintiff ’s case by determining, based on the court’s conclusions as to 
plausibility, whether a jury would find the legal claim to be proven. While some 
contend that this was already occurring pervasively in summary judgment decisions 
prior to Twombly,8 Twombly has imported this approach into the earlier stage of pre-
discovery dismissal motions and motions for judgment on the pleadings. The 
Supreme Court’s construction of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now 
arguably requires more than mere “notice pleading,” instead requiring factual 
assertions sufficient to make a discrimination claim appear “plausible” to the trial 
judge before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct discovery, based on the 
limited knowledge that the plaintiff and his or her counsel may have at that stage.9
6. Panelists and speakers included the Honorable Mark W. Bennett, the Honorable Denny Chin, the 
Honorable Bernice B. Donald, Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, the Honorable Nancy Gertner, 
Elizabeth Grossman, Rebecca M. Hamburg, Diane S. King, Minna J. Kotkin, David L. Lee, Suzette 
M. Malveaux, Ann C. McGinley, Scott A. Moss, the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, Joseph A. Seiner, Richard T. Seymour, and Suja A. Thomas.
7. Articles in this symposium issue can be found at 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 653–986 (2012–2013). Several 
of the symposium articles present statistics documenting that employment discrimination cases suffer 
pretrial dismissal at higher rates than other categories of federal civil claims. See, e.g., Hon. Denny 
Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 671, 672–73 (2012–2013); Hon. Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No 
Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685, 
697–701 (2012–2013).
8. See generally Bennett, supra note 7.
9. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–63 (2007).
662
IntroductIon: trIal by Jury or trIal by MotIon?
i.  sOME histOriCaL pErspECtiVE
 Congress did not enact Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 in a vacuum. 
As early as the 1940s, state legislators began to propose statutes addressing the 
problem of employment discrimination, and states began to enact them. David 
Freeman Engstrom’s account of the early history of legislation in this field documents 
the unfolding debate about how best to enforce statutory policies against employment 
discrimination.11 He identifies a bill introduced in the Michigan state legislature in 
1943 as “the first fully enforceable law prohibiting job discrimination ever proposed 
in any legislature in the United States.”12 This bill, which was not enacted, would 
have prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race or color, creed, sex, 
or national origin. It made employment discrimination a misdemeanor, a criminal 
offense, and authorized fines of up to $500 and imprisonment of up to six months for 
discriminatory actions by employers. It also created a private civil right of action for 
back pay, and authorized class actions. It empowered what was then the Michigan 
Department of Labor and Industry to hold public hearings and to issue cease-and-
desist orders, as well as orders to take “affirmative action including the hiring, 
re-hiring or training of employees discriminated against.”13
 Under this early legislative proposal, there was a mix of judicial and administrative 
remedies. Criminal law enforcement authorities were authorized to act upon 
complaints. Individuals were authorized to sue for make-whole relief. Groups of 
employees were authorized to form classes and to bring suit collectively, making back 
pay actions against large employers feasible. A state executive branch agency was 
authorized to undertake the function of administrative hearings and to order 
administrative remedies. Although the legislators had proposed an array of remedial 
pathways, a central feature of the bill was the right to sue and have a day in court, 
albeit with limited relief.14
 Engstrom reports that state legislatures and Congress were literally f looded with 
proposals to enact employment discrimination statutes after World War II, with the 
first being enacted in New York in 1945. By the time Title VII was enacted in 1964, 
“nearly two dozen nonsouthern states that were home to more than ninety percent of 
African Americans outside the South had already enacted legislation mandating 
equal treatment in employment.”15
 The major focus of Professor Engstrom’s article is on the tension—a heated and 
intense debate among civil rights advocates—over how employment discrimination 
cases should be handled. There was a significant divide between those who favored 
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
11. David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the 
Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1071 (2011).
12. Id. at 1073.
13. Id. at 1072–73.
14. See id. at 1072.
15. Id. at 1079.
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enlisting the courts as the main battleground and those who preferred an 
administrative approach, usually through the establishment of a Fair Employment 
Practices Commission (FEPC) that would be authorized to investigate, conciliate, 
hold hearings, and issue cease-and-desist orders, following the model for adjudicatory 
administrative agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board. Advocates of 
the FEPC approach feared that the costs and delays inherent in litigation would pose 
significant barriers to vindicating plaintiffs’ rights, and many of the pre–Title VII 
enactments embraced the administrative approach. A government-funded agency, 
designed to investigate, conciliate, award remedies, and seek enforcement in the 
courts under a deferential standard of review looked to some like the preferred 
mechanism, and this was an approach of many early statutes. But such a method 
could only be satisfactory with a well-funded administrative effort equal to the case 
load, and early statutes that embraced this approach have not lived up to the 
theoretical promise.16
 When Congress passed Title VII, it emphasized the administrative approach by 
creating the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),17 by requiring 
that claims under Title VII be filed first with the EEOC or a state or local agency 
with comparable jurisdiction and remedial powers,18 and by providing for 
administrative investigation and conciliation as prerequisites to court action.19 The 
EEOC was not empowered to initiate litigation; rather, the statute authorized the 
U.S. Attorney General to initiate litigation at the request of the EEOC, but the 
statute also authorized private lawsuits by parties who had exhausted their 
administrative remedies.20 Relief was limited to equitable remedies (including make-
whole relief reduced by mitigation requirements) so jury trials were not provided. 
Congress subsequently amended the statute to authorize the EEOC to bring some 
cases on its own, and eventually, in 1991, Congress authorized jury trials for 
allegations of intentional discrimination and possible compensatory and punitive 
damages (subject to a statutory cap).21
ii. thE tWOMbLY and iQbaL dECisiOns
 The 1991 amendments authorizing jury trials and expanding remedial relief 
would appear to have been intended to enhance the availability of a day in court for 
plaintiffs. These developments would naturally contribute to an increase in federal 
court filings under Title VII, but at the same time the Supreme Court’s “trilogy” of 
16. Id. passim.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352 § 705, 78 Stat. 258 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 
(2006)).
18. See id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(f)(1) (2006)).
19. Id.
20. Id. §§ 705(g)(6), 706(b), (e), 78 Stat. 258–60 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e4(g)(6), 
2005-e5(b) (2006)).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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summary judgment cases from the 1980s22 would encourage employers to file more 
motions for summary judgment and trial courts to grant them. As the proportion of 
the federal district court caseloads devoted to employment discrimination claims 
grew, pretrial motion practice accelerated as well, and the rate of summary judgments 
granted to employers grew. The Supreme Court, already very conservative in the 
1980s and 1990s, became more conservative in the new century with the appointments 
by President George W. Bush of Chief Justice John Roberts to replace Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Samuel Alito to replace Associate Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor. This Supreme Court majority seems dedicated to further 
narrowing plaintiffs’ access to federal trials, the key cases being Twombly and Iqbal, 
decided after these appointments had changed the composition of the Court that 
decided Swierkiewicz.23
 At first glance, it would be difficult to see the relevance of Twombly to an 
employment discrimination claim. The case concerned a class action by consumers 
under the federal antitrust laws, contending that there was a conspiracy among local 
telephone and Internet service providers to avoid competition through agreements to 
allocate territory and customers.24 When they filed suit, the plaintiffs asserted that 
such a conspiracy existed and recited instances of parallel business conduct by the 
defendants as supporting the conspiracy allegation.25 The Supreme Court decided 
these factual allegations were not enough to state a “plausible” case.26 A majority of 
the Court found that because the parallel business conduct could be simply explained 
as an instance of competitors independently arriving at their own decisions about 
how to price and market their services, it was not enough for the plaintiffs to allege a 
conspiracy in order to put the defendants to the burden of submitting to discovery.27 
The Court saw the allegation of a conspiracy or agreement as “conclusory”—not a 
factual allegation entitled to the presumption of being true that a trial court would 
normally apply in determining a motion to dismiss—and rejected the lower court’s 
reliance on a prior Supreme Court decision stating that a case should not be dismissed 
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”28 In order to survive such a motion, 
22. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
23. Twombly was a 7–2 decision, with Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissenting. Iqbal 
was 5–4, with the Twombly dissenters being joined in dissent by Justice David Souter (the author of the 
majority opinion in Twombly) and Justice Stephen Breyer. The Justices appointed after Swierkiewicz was 
decided helped make up the majority in Twombly and Iqbal, decisively so in Iqbal given the division of 
the Court over extending Twombly—with its particular focus on the context of antitrust litigation—
more generally as an across-the-board rule of federal civil litigation.
24. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–50 (2007).
25. Id. at 550–51.
26. Id. at 556–57.
27. Id. at 557–60.
28. Id. at 557, 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
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the plaintiffs now had to allege facts from which a plausible inference could be drawn 
that there was an actual agreement among the defendants, not just the appearance of 
an agreement suggested by their overt business conduct. These facts would necessarily 
have to be based on the plaintiffs’ own investigations, without the benefit of discovery. 
Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting, objected to the idea 
that a complainant had to do much more under Rule 8 than to give notice to the 
defendants of the legal theory under which they were being sued.29
 Twombly seemed inconsistent with the Federal Rules themselves. Rule 8 requires 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”30 Should not an allegation that defendants conspired to eliminate competition 
in a particular market and acted in a manner consistent with such an allegation be 
enough to survive a motion to dismiss under a rule providing that a complaint must 
offer “a short and plain statement of the claim”? If the signs of parallel conduct 
would be consistent with the existence of an agreement, should not the parties have 
an opportunity to conduct discovery in search of evidence? Does Rule 8’s requirement 
that the plaintiff ’s allegations must show “that the pleader is entitled to relief ”31 
mean that the plaintiff ’s complaint must set forth the evidentiary basis for the 
plaintiff ’s claim, before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct discovery?32 
As plaintiffs in an antitrust case are seeking to vindicate not only their own interests 
as competitors or consumers but also the public interest, as articulated by Congress 
in the antitrust laws, should not an allegation of the existence of smoke be sufficient 
to authorize discovery in search of an underlying fire? A reader of the Court’s opinion 
could conclude that the Court’s emphasis on the antitrust context of the case and the 
particular burdens of discovery that would be imposed in a nationwide class action 
against a huge industry might mean that the Court was setting up a special pleading 
requirement for antitrust class actions.
 But Iqbal exploded that possibility. Like Twombly, Iqbal was not an employment 
discrimination case. But in Iqbal, this time by a bare 5–4 majority, the Court 
indicated that Twombly’s factual pleading standard applied broadly to all pleadings 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33 Iqbal was another case in which the 
29. Id. at 570–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens voiced “fear that the unfortunate result of the 
majority’s new pleading rule will be to invite lawyers’ debates over economic theory to conclusively 
resolve antitrust suits in the absence of any evidence.” Id. at 595.
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. This would surely be inconsistent with Swierkiewicz, where the Court rejected the contention that the 
plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to meet the test for a prima facie case under its seminal 
Title VII decision, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002).
33. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). Rejecting the argument that Twombly should be limited to 
pleadings in antitrust cases, the Court stated:
Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the 
decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. 550 U.S., at 554. 
That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard “in all civil actions and proceedings in 
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particular issues in dispute might have signaled a ruling confined to the factual 
setting: a person rounded up in the security panic after the 9/11 terror attacks 
asserted a claim of unconstitutional treatment in detention, naming as defendants, 
among others, the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).34 These defendants sought dismissal on grounds of qualified 
immunity. Instead of relying on the qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court 
invoked Twombly and said that it was not enough for the plaintiff to allege that 
Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller shared 
responsibility for the mistreatment that the plaintiff had suffered in custody. The 
Court characterized such allegations as “conclusory”—the epithet it had attached to 
the plaintiffs’ allegations in Twombly—and, thus, not entitled to be assumed to be 
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.35 Instead, the Court said, only factual 
assertions about the specific role alleged to have been played by those named 
defendants were entitled to be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, and 
then the trial court would have to decide whether, if those factual assertions were 
assumed to be true, they gave rise to a “plausible inference” of discriminatory intent 
towards the plaintiff.36
 This sounds very much like telling lower federal courts that they are to apply 
something akin to the summary judgment standard for evaluating factual allegations 
in deciding whether the defendant is entitled to dismissal of a complaint as a matter 
of law. Our symposium participants suggest that some federal courts have taken it 
that way—that the courts have applied this heightened standard in employment 
discrimination cases, even though the Court did not expressly overrule its own 
precedent, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,37 which had described a less demanding 
notice pleading approach under Rule 8, and had emphasized authorization of liberal 
pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules in the context of employment litigation.
iii. thE sYMpOsiUM artiCLEs
 So, we come back to the underlying policy question: Who should decide 
employment discrimination cases, and how?
 According to the federal employment discrimination statutes read in light of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, what should the process and standard be for 
determining whether a plaintiff gets his or her day in court? Does the federal 
the United States district courts.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly 
expounded the pleading standard for “all civil actions,” ibid., and it applies to antitrust 
and discrimination suits alike. See 550 U.S., at 555–556, and n. 3.
 Id. (parallel citations omitted).
34. Id. at 666–68.
35. Id. at 681.
36. Id. at 682–83.
37. 534 U.S. 506 (2002); see supra text accompanying note 5. Of course, Justice Kennedy did state in Iqbal 
that the Twombly construction of Rule 8 applied to all federal civil litigation, including discrimination 
cases. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684; see supra text accompanying note 33.
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litigation record of the recent past accord with congressional intent expressed in Title 
VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, about how these cases should be 
decided? And, if not, what can be done about it?
 In constructing this program, the planners decided to begin with a view from the 
bench, to bring together federal trial and appellate judges who have had the difficult 
task of presiding over employment discrimination cases over the period of these 
evolving interpretations of Title VII and the Federal Rules. Several of the judicial 
participants in the symposium’s first panel (A View from the Bench—The Judges’ 
Perspective on Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases)38 and the keynote 
speaker for the symposium,39 all of whom had served as federal trial judges for some or 
all of this period, have authored or coauthored articles published in this symposium.
 Judge Denny Chin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who 
served from 1994 through 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, offers an overall judicial perspective on summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases, reflecting both his trial and appellate experience, 
drawn from his keynote remarks.40 While acknowledging the statistics showing the 
high rate of discrimination cases lost through pretrial motions, Judge Chin suggests 
that the large proportion of pro se litigants, together with shortcomings in advocacy 
on behalf of plaintiffs, have contributed to the problem.41 The Honorable Mark W. 
Bennett of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, an outspoken 
proponent of allowing more employment discrimination cases to go to trial, documents 
the stark decline in trials and a general judicial bias in favor of granting summary 
judgment in employment discrimination cases, arguing that allowing more cases to go 
to trial would not only be fairer to plaintiffs, but would also be more closely in accord 
with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution as well as the framers of Rules 8 
and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.42 The Honorable Bernice B. Donald, 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, who previously served as a trial 
judge in the Western District of Tennessee and as a Bankruptcy Judge, has collaborated 
with her former clerk, J. Eric Pardue, who is now practicing with Vinson & Elkins 
LLP, in Houston.43 Their article focuses on the allegation that the federal judiciary is 
38. N.Y. Law Sch. Law Review, Summary Judgment and Employment Discrimination Symposium - Panel I 
(Apr. 23, 2012), YouTube (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8c8rrIeRpxc.
39. The Honorable Denny Chin, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, Keynote Address at the New 
York Law School Law Review Symposium: Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, 
and Employment Discrimination (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vc-
HZAA1Mrk&feature=youtu.be.
40. See Chin, supra note 7.
41. Id. at 675.
42. Bennett, supra note 7. Indeed, Judge Bennett suggests that if he were able to change the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, his “first edict would be to eliminate summary judgment altogether. . . . for a five- to ten-year 
period to evaluate the pros and cons of our federal justice system without summary judgment.” Id. at 710.
43. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, Simple Suggestion 
for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and Summary Judgment, 57 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 749 (2012–2013).
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biased against employment discrimination plaintiffs, with a particular focus on 
inferences that many courts draw in favor of defendants in the context of deciding 
pretrial motions. They find this allegation to be borne out by the evidence of certain 
“doctrines” that courts summon to explain away factual allegations suggestive of 
discriminatory intent. They suggest that courts should take much more seriously “the 
Supreme Court’s instruction to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party” in deciding summary judgment motions.44 Harvard Law Professor and 
former U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner and Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider of 
Brooklyn Law School,45 focus on the “substantive law dimensions” of the procedural 
decisions that federal courts make in employment discrimination cases, taking the 
Supreme Court’s narrowing of the availability of class actions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes46 as the starting point for their argument.
 The other articles from the symposium mix commentary from practitioners and 
academics. Professor Suzette M. Malveaux of the Catholic University of America, 
Columbus School of Law, examines whether Twombly and Iqbal have actually 
changed the direction of employment discrimination litigation.47 After reviewing 
empirical studies, Malveaux concludes that the impact of these cases “remains 
elusive.” “[E]mpirical data alone” cannot answer the question whether the heightened 
pleading standard under Rule 8 announced in these cases has made a major difference, 
she writes, in light of the strong trend towards granting employers’ summary 
judgment motions that predated these cases.48 Professor Deborah Thompson 
Eisenberg of the University of Maryland School of Law turns the focus to summary 
judgment in Equal Pay Act cases, documenting the steady increase of dispositions by 
summary judgment on claims that are heavily based on factual disputes and shining 
a light on the practices of trial courts in dealing with these cases to figure out why 
summary judgment is being so frequently granted in an area where the parties 
typically sharply dispute the facts.49 Professor Ann C. McGinley of the William S. 
Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, focusing on one of the most significant 
“reverse discrimination” cases under Title VII, Ricci v. DeStefano,50 explores the 
theory of “cognitive illiberalism” as an explanation for the Supreme Court’s decision 
44. Id. at 762–63.
45. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Hon. Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law 
Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 767 (2012–2013). Judge Gertner served in the District of Massachusetts.
46. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
47. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out for Civil Rights and Employment 
Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 719 (2012–2013).
48. Id. at 722.
49. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse of Summary Judgment in Equal 
Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 815 (2012–2013).
50. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). A “reverse discrimination” case is a claim of discrimination in favor of minorities; in this 
case, white firefighters in New Haven, Connecticut, claimed that the city set aside the results of a promotion 
examination because minority firefighters did not score highly enough to be promoted. Id. at 561.
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to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs rather than to remand that case for trial, 
despite the sharply contested facts of why the employer acted as it did in setting aside 
the results of a promotion test that appeared to produce a significant disparate impact 
on the basis of race.51 Professor Scott A. Moss of the University of Colorado Law 
School contributes a searching critique of the briefs submitted by counsel for 
employment discrimination plaintiffs in opposition to Rule 12 dismissal motions and 
Rule 56 summary judgment motions, suggesting that one of the contributing factors 
to the high rate of pretrial judgments in favor of employers may be significant 
shortcomings in advocacy—a point that Judge Chin also makes in his article.52
 Finally, two Chicago employment law practitioners, David L. Lee and Jennifer C. 
Weiss, have collaborated on an article that contrasts how the process of drawing 
inferences from facts in employment discrimination cases substantially differs from 
judicial inference-drawing in other areas of federal litigation, again showing judicial 
predisposition to give employers the benefit of the doubt in cases where disputes over 
the meaning of facts should arguably be left to jurors.53 They launch their inquiry 
with a fascinating look at the oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp. and the subsequent decision by that 
court,54 providing startlingly direct evidence for their thesis. They then show how 
federal courts employ a long list of standard “anti-inference doctrines” (previously 
identified in a survey of plaintiff employment lawyers)55 to justify granting pretrial 
rulings against employment discrimination plaintiffs, developing in detail how those 
doctrines run counter to the approach of federal courts in other kinds of cases.
 Taken together, the articles published as part of this symposium issue provide an 
in-depth look at pretrial motion practice in employment discrimination cases from the 
perspective of those on the front lines as well as in the academy, together with many 
practical suggestions that should be useful to counsel for plaintiffs and instructive for 
judges seeking to provide fair consideration to plaintiffs when ruling on such motions.
51. Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: An Examination of Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 895 (2012–2013).
52. Scott A. Moss, (In)competence in Appellate and District Court Brief Writing on Rule 12 and 56 Motions, 57 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 841 (2012–2013); see also Chin, supra note 7, at 677, 680–81.
53. David L. Lee & Jennifer C. Weiss, Inferences in Employment Law Compared to Other Areas of the Law: 
Turning the Rules Upside Down, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 781 (2013).
54. 690 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2012).
55. The survey was conducted by the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), an organization 
of lawyers who specialize in representing employee plaintiffs. Lee and Weiss list nine inferences 
pervasively drawn by trial judges in employment discrimination cases to justify ruling in favor of 
defendants. Lee & Weiss, supra note 53, at Part III.A.
